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'fragments/reports', 'Why Constitution is not Identity' and 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)'
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12 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
8969
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We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
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Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
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16077
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The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
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Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
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Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
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16081
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The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
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16082
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Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
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Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
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12152
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Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
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Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
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