Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'Sameness and Substance' and 'Remembrance of Things Past'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
21 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
|
16492
|
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
|
|
16493
|
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
|
16496
|
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
|
16495
|
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
|
|
16501
|
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
|
|
16506
|
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
|
13276
|
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
|
13277
|
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
|
16509
|
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
|
16514
|
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
|
16510
|
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
|
16503
|
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
|
16499
|
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
|
|
16515
|
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
|
16517
|
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
|
16497
|
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
|
|
16502
|
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
|
|
16498
|
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
|
16521
|
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
|
16505
|
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
|
16494
|
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
|