Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'On the Plurality of Worlds' and 'Metaphysics: a very short introduction'

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13 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]