Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'On the Plurality of Worlds' and 'Essential Attribution'

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18 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
13276 The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
13277 The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]