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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causality and Properties' and 'On the Plurality of Worlds'

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51 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
15092 Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
8543 Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
8551 Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
8557 To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15761 We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
15756 Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15758 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
8547 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
8549 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
12678 Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
8545 A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
15757 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
15759 The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
15760 Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
15762 Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
8552 If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
4040 The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
15765 Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
8548 Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
9485 Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
15747 Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8550 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]