Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Nature's Metaphysics' and 'The Nature and Communication of Substance'
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14 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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9502
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There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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9477
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Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
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9490
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The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
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9495
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If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
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9492
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Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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9503
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To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
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14540
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Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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9450
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If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
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9498
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The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
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9474
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A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
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9475
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A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
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9499
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Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
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9486
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Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
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9472
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Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
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