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Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'fragments/reports' and 'Nature's Metaphysics'

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29 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
9502 There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
9503 To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14540 Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
9474 A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
9475 A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
9499 Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
227 You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
9486 Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
211 If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
219 If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
228 Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
16151 Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
210 It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
220 The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
217 Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
214 If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]