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Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Reference and Modality' and 'The Metaphysics of Properties'
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34 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10719
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There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
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10721
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If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
10716
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There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
10720
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We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10714
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The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
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10715
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There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10738
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Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
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10739
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The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
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10740
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The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
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10741
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Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
10742
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Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10472
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'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
223
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If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
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227
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You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10730
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If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
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10724
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Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
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7963
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Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
10727
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Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
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7962
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Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
211
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If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
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219
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If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
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228
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Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
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16151
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Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
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210
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It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
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220
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The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
218
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Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
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10722
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Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
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215
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If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
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212
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The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
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213
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Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
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216
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If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
214
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If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
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217
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Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10744
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Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
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