Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Powers' and 'The Theory of Transfinite Numbers'
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31 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
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11927
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Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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11915
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If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
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11916
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'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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11956
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'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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11928
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Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
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11933
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A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
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11932
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Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
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11934
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The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
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11947
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Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
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11952
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The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
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11953
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Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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11943
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Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
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11939
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If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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227
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You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
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223
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If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
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211
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If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
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219
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If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
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228
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Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
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16151
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Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
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210
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It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
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220
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The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
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218
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Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
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213
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Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
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216
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If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
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215
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If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
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212
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The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
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214
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If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
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217
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Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
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11914
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Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
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11913
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For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
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11962
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Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
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