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Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'A Survey of Metaphysics' and 'works'
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22 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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4234
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Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
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4235
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Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
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4236
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Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
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4197
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The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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227
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You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
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223
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If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
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210
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It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
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220
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The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
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211
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If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
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219
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If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
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228
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Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
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16151
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Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
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218
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Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
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212
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The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
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215
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If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
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213
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Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
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216
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If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
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217
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Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
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214
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If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
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4232
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Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
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4205
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'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
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4233
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If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
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