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Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Reality and Representation' and 'Universals'

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33 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4462 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
4463 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
4449 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
227 You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
4450 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
4454 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4468 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
4452 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
4467 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
4469 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
211 If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
219 If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
228 Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
16151 Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
4472 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
210 It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
220 The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
217 Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
214 If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
4459 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4457 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]