Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow' and 'Universals'

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29 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
227 You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
211 If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
219 If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
228 Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
16151 Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
210 It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
220 The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
217 Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
214 If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]