Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth' and 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism'

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20 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5468 Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
5469 The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
5481 Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
5458 Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
227 You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
211 If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
219 If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
228 Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
16151 Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
210 It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
220 The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
214 If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
217 Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]