Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Dispositions and Powers' and 'Universals'

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31 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
23708 Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
23709 Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4462 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
4463 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
23707 Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23714 Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
23711 A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23712 Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
23698 Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23699 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23700 A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23701 A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23702 A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23703 Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23704 We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
4450 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
4449 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
4454 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4468 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
4452 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
4467 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
4469 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
4472 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
4459 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4457 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]