Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Monadology' and 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)'
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18 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
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8643
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Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
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229
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The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
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21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
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8911
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If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
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8634
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The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
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17443
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Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
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17445
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Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
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7644
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The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
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11857
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He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
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7843
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Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
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12751
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It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
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19363
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Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
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19352
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A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
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10539
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Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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221
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Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
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17431
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Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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13879
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For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
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10642
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Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo]
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