Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' and 'Essential vs Accidental Properties'
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15 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
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8321
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All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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8300
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Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
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8281
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Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
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8270
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Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
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8308
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Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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8314
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Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
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8316
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Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
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8318
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The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
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8323
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It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
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8313
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Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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8258
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Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
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8301
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Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
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8283
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Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
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8284
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The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
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13122
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Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
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