Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'A Survey of Metaphysics' and 'The Impossibility of Superdupervenience'

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12 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
4239 Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
4202 Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
4201 Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
4219 Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
4221 Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
4220 Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
4225 Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
4196 The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]