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Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Critique of Judgement II: Teleological' and 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)'

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43 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege]
Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge]
Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege]
'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege]
Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes]
The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege]
Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock]
Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege]
Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C]
Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C]
For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett]
Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman]
"Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege]
For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman]
A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell]
Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman]
The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait]
Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins]
Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait]
Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner]
Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M]
Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C]
Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C]
Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege]
Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege]
The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau]
A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege]
If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS]
Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter]
Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege]
'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman]
From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend]
Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro]
Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C]
One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock]
Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege]