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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intermediate Logic' and 'New Essays on Human Understanding'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock]