Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Truth and Ontology' and 'Truth-making and Correspondence'
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26 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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18365
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If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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14415
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A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
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18362
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Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18360
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It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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18358
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Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
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14408
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Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
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14395
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If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
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18355
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What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
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14398
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Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
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14403
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If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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14397
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Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
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14396
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If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
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14400
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If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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14394
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It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18354
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Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
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14390
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Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
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18363
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Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
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18356
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Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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14412
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Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
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14414
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I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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18364
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Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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18357
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What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
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18359
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One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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14391
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If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
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14418
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Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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14419
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Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
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