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'fragments/reports', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)' and 'Problems of Philosophy'
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17 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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5420
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Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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19125
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If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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5419
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Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
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5417
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A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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7395
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Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
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5428
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Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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5421
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The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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5424
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Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]
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5423
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If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell]
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5422
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More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19128
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If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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19120
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Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19127
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The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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19124
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A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
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19126
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If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
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19129
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The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
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19130
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KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
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