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'fragments/reports', 'Truth and Ontology' and '04: Gospel of St John'
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19 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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8821
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Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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14415
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A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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14408
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Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
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14395
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If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
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14398
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Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
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14403
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If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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14397
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Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
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14396
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If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
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14400
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If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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14394
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It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
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21388
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The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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14390
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Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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14412
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Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
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14414
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I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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20780
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Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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20793
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How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
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14418
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Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
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14391
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If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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14419
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Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
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