Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction'
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15 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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18369
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There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
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21388
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The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
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The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19318
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A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
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If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19320
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If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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6335
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The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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6344
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Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
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6337
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The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
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6336
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No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
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Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
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