Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Metaphysics' and 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations'

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28 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle]
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle]
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle]
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]