Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'The Iliad' and 'Value Theory'
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22 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
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3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
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20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
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18666
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Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
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18667
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The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
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18685
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Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
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18679
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Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
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18682
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A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
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18683
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Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
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18686
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The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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18672
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Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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18677
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A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
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20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
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18670
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The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
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18669
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Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
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18668
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Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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21819
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Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
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5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
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1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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