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'fragments/reports', 'Induction' and 'Principia Ethica'
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21 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
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8039
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Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
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22151
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The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
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11056
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The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
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8033
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Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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8032
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Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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11050
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Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
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23726
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Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
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3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
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20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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18676
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We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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11057
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It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
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5925
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The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
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5902
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For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
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5903
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'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
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5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
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1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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