Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'My Philosophical Development'
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17 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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6238
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We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
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6239
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We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
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6240
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The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
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6242
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We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
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6247
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Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
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3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
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20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
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6244
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Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
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6243
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As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
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5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
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1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
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6246
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My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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