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Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'How to Make our Ideas Clear' and 'Protagoras'
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13 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202
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No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193
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Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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197
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Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
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200
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People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
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