Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason'' and 'Emotivism'
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15 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2848
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Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
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2851
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Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
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2853
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Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
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2852
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Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
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2849
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Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
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2850
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How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
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3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
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20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
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5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
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1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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