Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit' and 'The Metaphysics of Modality'
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13 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6237
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Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6234
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If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6233
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A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
6236
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People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
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