Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Thought and Reality' and 'On What There Is'
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11 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
8168
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To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8181
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A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
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8182
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Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
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8183
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If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
8176
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We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8170
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Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
1619
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There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1609
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I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
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1617
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The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19159
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Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
8169
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We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
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