Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' and 'Mental Files'
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30 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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21654
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The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
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21641
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Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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16356
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There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
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16393
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In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]
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16386
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Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
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16372
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Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
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16388
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We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
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16359
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Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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16355
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Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
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16348
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Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
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16384
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Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
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16352
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A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
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16353
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Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
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21638
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Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
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21658
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Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
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21659
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'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
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21655
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Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
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16382
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Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
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16389
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If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati]
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16363
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Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati]
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16364
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Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
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16351
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In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
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16350
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Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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21656
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Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
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21635
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Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
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21662
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Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
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16380
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Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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11240
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The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
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21645
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'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
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21639
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'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
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