Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'In a Critical Condition' and 'Metaphysics'
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24 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
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23311
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Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
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23310
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Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
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2497
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Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
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2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
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2496
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Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
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2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
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11245
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Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
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2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
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2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
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10954
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It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
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9792
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Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
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9077
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Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
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9075
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If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
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