Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)' and '09: Galatians'
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21 ideas
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
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5175
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Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
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1363
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Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
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1368
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Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
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1373
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Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
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1380
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Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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5511
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For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
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12509
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If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
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1376
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Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
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12512
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If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
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12513
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If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
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12514
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On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
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1397
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Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
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6139
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Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
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5513
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Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
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1345
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Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
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1197
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No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
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1364
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Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
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12511
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If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
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1361
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If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
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21326
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Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
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1387
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Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
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