Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)' and '09: Galatians'

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32 ideas

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
5512 Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
1202 A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
1381 Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke]
1385 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
1372 Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke]
1378 My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5175 Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
1363 Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
1368 Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
1373 Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
1380 Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5511 For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
12509 If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
1376 Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
12512 If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
12513 If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
12514 On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
1397 Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
6139 Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
5513 Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
1345 Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
1197 No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
1364 Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
12511 If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
1361 If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
21326 Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
1387 Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
12809 Nothing about me is essential [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3792 We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
12494 Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
12492 Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke]
12493 A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke]