Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory' and 'Real Essence'
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17 ideas
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
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1359
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Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
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21319
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I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
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21323
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The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
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21321
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Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
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21324
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If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
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21325
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Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
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21327
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If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
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1366
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If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
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1352
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Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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