Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Person and Object' and 'The Blank Slate'
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14 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
15811
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I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
15815
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Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
15813
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People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
15803
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Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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7509
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Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker]
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15821
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Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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