Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity' and 'The Problem of the Soul'
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16 ideas
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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5351
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We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
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5353
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The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan]
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5354
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We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
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5349
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For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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5338
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Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan]
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5344
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Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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5332
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People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan]
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5345
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We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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