Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Killing and Letting Die' and 'Transcendence of the Ego'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
19 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
7109
|
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
7106
|
The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
7117
|
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
|
7123
|
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
|
22225
|
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
7116
|
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
|
7124
|
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
7120
|
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
7110
|
If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7115
|
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
|
7121
|
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
|
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
|
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808
|
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
|
20835
|
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836
|
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
|
21679
|
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
|
20837
|
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
|
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
|