Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?' and 'The Discourses'
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16 ideas
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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23329
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We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
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23342
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Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
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23330
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Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
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23332
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Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
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23331
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Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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23338
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You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20875
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If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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23347
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If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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