Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Analogy of Religion' and 'Universals'
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12 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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21317
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Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
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21313
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If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
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21314
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Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
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21318
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If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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