Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'De ente praedicamentali' and 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo'
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15 ideas
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
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1855
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If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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1856
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Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
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1862
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However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
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1849
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Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
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1861
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The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
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1853
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Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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1854
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We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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