Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'The Roots of Romanticism' and 'The Ethics'
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15 ideas
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
4814
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A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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21802
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An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza]
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4837
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'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza]
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4843
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Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza]
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4844
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The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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4311
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We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza]
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7828
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The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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