Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature?' and 'Introduction to 'Personal Identity''
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11 ideas
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5503
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Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
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5504
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Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
5502
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Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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