Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature?' and 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
15 ideas
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
13046
|
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
|
13058
|
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
13050
|
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
|
13059
|
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
|
13064
|
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13049
|
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
|
13051
|
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
|
13053
|
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13061
|
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
13045
|
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
|
13062
|
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
|
13063
|
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
13060
|
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
|
13056
|
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
|
13057
|
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
|