Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Evidence' and 'Against Coherence'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
15 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682
|
Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19684
|
Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
|
19687
|
Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
|
19688
|
Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
|
19686
|
Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
|
19680
|
Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
|
19681
|
If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
|
19689
|
Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683
|
Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515
|
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
|
21514
|
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496
|
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
|
21499
|
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
|
21502
|
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
|
21512
|
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
|