Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'The Case for Closure' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'
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7 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551
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How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
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19552
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We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
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19554
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Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804
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Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802
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Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801
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Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805
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Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
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