Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'The Republic'

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24 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11880 Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
4797 Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
17037 Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
4728 Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
16990 A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
9386 The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
4960 "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
4966 Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
2408 Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
13967 Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
13970 Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16992 Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
16993 If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
16998 Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
17001 A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
4952 Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
7761 Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
7693 Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
5821 Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
14068 If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
10436 A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
4953 We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
4961 It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
16986 That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]