Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' and 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
|
13857
|
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
|
13853
|
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
|
13855
|
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
|
|
13859
|
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
|
13854
|
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
|
9598
|
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
|
16536
|
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
|
|
9596
|
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
|