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| 7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain |
| Full Idea: The materialist theory Armstrong and I proposed joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity with a behaviourist or functionalist way of characterising mental states such as pain. | |||
| From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III) | |||
| A reaction: Armstrong has backed off from 'type-type' identity, because the realisations of a given mental state might be too diverse to be considered of the same type. Putnam's machine functionalism allows the possibility of dualism. |
| 7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent |
| Full Idea: The word 'pain' is a non-rigid designator; it is a contingent matter what state the concept and the word apply to. (Note: so the sort of theory Kripke argues against is not what we propose). | |||
| From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III) | |||
| A reaction: I like the view that a given quale is necessarily identical to a given mental state, but that many mental states might occupy a given behavioural role. The smell of roses might occupy the behavioural role of pain. Frog pain isn't quite like ours. |
| 7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia |
| Full Idea: To pass our test it seems that our theory will have to be a 'mixed' theory, to account for the Madman (whose pain has odd causes, and odd effects) and also for the Martian (who has normal causes and effects, but an odd physical state). | |||
| From: report of David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §II) by PG - Db (ideas) | |||
| A reaction: A statement that 'pain' is ambiguous (qualia/causal role) would help a lot here. Martians have the causal role but no qualia, and the madman has the qualia but lacks the causal role. I say lots of different qualia might have the same causal role. |